日期:2026/02/28   IAE 

Civilizational Antitrust and Market Structure Rebalancing:

A Life-Value-Oriented Reformulation of Industrial Organization Theory

Frank Chen
Civilizational Economic School (Charity Economicism)

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Abstract

Traditional antitrust doctrine evaluates market structure primarily through price, output restriction, and allocative efficiency. While this framework captures consumer welfare distortions arising from market power, it systematically excludes civilizational externalities—ecological degradation, intergenerational risk transfer, and systemic life-value erosion. This paper proposes a Civilizational Antitrust Model (CAM), which integrates life-value-adjusted marginal cost into industrial organization theory. By introducing a Life-Adjusted Pricing Condition (LAPC) and a Civilizational Antitrust Index (CAI), the model extends monopoly and oligopoly equilibrium analysis to include ecological and civilizational risk constraints. The results demonstrate that conventional equilibria underprice long-term survival costs. The normative objective of competition policy must therefore shift from allocative efficiency maximization to minimization of civilizational opportunity cost under sustainability constraints.

Keywords: antitrust theory, civilizational economics, life-value pricing, industrial organization, ecological externalities, intergenerational justice

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1. Introduction

Antitrust policy has historically centered on allocative efficiency and consumer welfare (Bork, 1978; Posner, 2001). Under the standard framework, competitive harm is inferred when price exceeds marginal cost:

 

$$P > MC$$$$P>MC$$

However, modern production systems generate ecological and systemic risks that extend beyond static price distortions (Arrow, 1969; Nordhaus, 2013). Traditional industrial organization models omit:

1. Ecological external costs

2. Intergenerational depletion

3. Systemic civilizational risk

This paper argues that competition law must evolve to incorporate civilizational sustainability constraints. The objective of regulation should not merely be lower prices but lower long-run systemic risk.

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2. The Standard Monopoly Model

Consider inverse demand:

$$P(Q) = a - bQ$$$$P(Q)=a-bQ$$

Private cost:

$$C(Q) = cQ + \frac{d}{2}Q^2$$C(Q)=cQ+2d​Q2

Marginal cost:

$$MC(Q) = c + dQ$$$$MC(Q)=c+dQ$$

Profit maximization:

$$MR = MC$$$$MR=MC$$ $$a - 2bQ = c + dQ$$$$a-2bQ=c+dQ$$ $$Q^M = \frac{a - c}{2b + d}$$QM=2b+da−c​

This equilibrium omits ecological and life-value costs.

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3. Civilizational Cost Extension

Let ecological external cost be:

$$EC(Q) = \frac{e}{2}Q^2$$EC(Q)=2e​Q2 $$MEC(Q) = eQ$$$$MEC(Q)=eQ$$

Let life-value loss (civilizational risk contribution) be:

$$LV(Q) = \frac{v}{2}(\kappa Q)^2$$LV(Q)=2v​(κQ)2 $$MLV(Q) = v\kappa^2Q$$MLV(Q)=vκ2Q

Total social marginal cost:

$$MSC(Q) = MC(Q) + MEC(Q) + MLV(Q)$$$$MSC(Q)=MC(Q)+MEC(Q)+MLV(Q)$$ $$MSC(Q) = c + (d + e + v\kappa^2)Q$$MSC(Q)=c+(d+e+vκ2)Q

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4. Life-Adjusted Pricing Condition (LAPC)

Civilizational equilibrium requires:

$$MR = MSC$$$$MR=MSC$$ $$a - 2bQ = c + (d + e + v\kappa^2)Q$$a−2bQ=c+(d+e+vκ2)Q $$Q^C = \frac{a - c}{2b + d + e + v\kappa^2}$$QC=2b+d+e+vκ2a−c​

Because:

$$d + e + v\kappa^2 > d$$d+e+vκ2>d $$Q^C < Q^M$$QC<QM

Life-adjusted equilibrium reduces output relative to monopoly equilibrium, thereby lowering systemic civilizational risk.

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5. Oligopoly Extension (Cournot Framework)

Standard Cournot equilibrium:

$$Q_i = \frac{a - c}{b(n + 1)}$$Qi​=b(n+1)a−c​

With civilizational adjustment:

$$Q_i^C = \frac{a - c}{b(n + 1) + e + v\kappa^2}$$QiC​=b(n+1)+e+vκ2a−c​

Thus, as ecological or life-value parameters increase, equilibrium output declines.

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6. Civilizational Antitrust Index (CAI)

Traditional concentration measure:

$$HHI = \sum s_i^2$$HHI=∑si2​

Civilizational extension:

$$CAI = HHI \cdot (1 + \phi CR)$$$$CAI=HHI\cdot (1+\varphi CR)$$

Where:

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• $CR$$CR$ = civilizational risk index

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• $\phi$$\varphi$ = amplification parameter

Regulatory trigger:

$$CAI > CAI_{threshold}$$CAI>CAIthreshold​

This embeds sustainability risk within merger review and structural policy.

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7. Civilizational Opportunity Cost

Define Civilizational Opportunity Cost (COC):

$$COC = Resource\ Depletion + Ecological\ Damage + Intergenerational\ Loss$$$$COC=ResourceDepletion+EcologicalDamage+IntergenerationalLoss$$

Policy objective:

$$\min COC$$$$\min COC$$

Subject to:

$$CR \leq 1$$$$CR\le 1$$

This redefines competition policy from static welfare optimization to survival-constrained minimization.

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8. Capital Cost Adjustment

Let financing rate depend on systemic risk:

$$r_c = r + \theta CR$$rc​=r+θCR

Higher civilizational risk increases capital costs, incentivizing structural transition.

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9. Normative Implications

Civilizational antitrust doctrine implies:

1. Merger review must incorporate ecological and life-value risk

2. High-risk concentration warrants structural remedies

3. Capital markets should internalize systemic sustainability constraints

4. Efficiency must be evaluated dynamically rather than statically

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10. Conclusion

This paper reformulates industrial organization theory by embedding life-value costs into marginal analysis. The transformation can be summarized as:

$$Max\ Efficiency \Rightarrow Min\ Civilizational\ Opportunity\ Cost$$$$MaxEfficiency\Rightarrow MinCivilizationalOpportunityCost$$

Antitrust must evolve from price-centric doctrine to survival-oriented institutional design.

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References (APA 7th Edition Format)

Arrow, K. J. (1969). The organization of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of market versus nonmarket allocation. The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures.

Bork, R. H. (1978). The antitrust paradox. Basic Books.

Nordhaus, W. D. (2013). The climate casino: Risk, uncertainty, and economics for a warming world. Yale University Press.

Posner, R. A. (2001). Antitrust law (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press.

Stiglitz, J. E. (1989). Markets, market failures, and development. American Economic Review, 79(2), 197–203.